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BASIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE 
      NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
Mitsuru Kurosawa*
  The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly on September 10, and opened for signature on 
September 24, 1996. Japan signed the Treaty following the five nuclear-weapon 
states on that same day, got approval for its ratification from the Diet, and deposited 
the instrument of ratification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on July 
8, 1997. Japan is the fourth country to ratify the Treaty following Fiji, Qatar and 
Uzbekistan. This fact shows Japan's positive attitude to the CTBT. As it was 
impossible for a draft Treaty to be adopted by the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) in Geneva, because of strong opposition by India, the draft Treaty was sent 
directly to the UN General Assembly by circumventing the adoption by the CD. In 
addition, as the condition of its entry into force is extremely severe, we can not 
expect its early entry into force. However, the rules of the CTBT have already been 
accepted as an international norm, because the draft Treaty was adopted at the UN 
General Assembly by overwhelming majority, with 158 states agreed and only 3 
states opposed.') 
  A nuclear test ban has been a central agenda of nuclear disarmament since 
1950s. It is designed as a measure to stop a qualitative nuclear arms race, that is, to 
stop qualitative development of nuclear weapons. In 1954, Prime Minister of India, 
Nehru, advocated stopping nuclear tests, partly influenced by the fact that Japanese 
fishermen had suffered from the U.S. thermonuclear testing at Bikini Atoll. As a 
result of the negotiations among the U.S., the U.K. and the Soviet Union since the 
late 1950s, they agreed on the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in August 1963. This Treaty does
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not prohibit testing underground and is called a Partial Test Ban Treaty. The three 
Governments said in its preamble, "seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test 
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to 
this end". This determination is recalled in the preamble of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968. 
  In 1974, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of 
Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which prohibited underground tests having a 
yield exceeding 150 kilotons, as a first step toward a comprehensive ban. However, 
in the 1970s and 80s, many underground tests were conducted, and more 
sophisticated nuclear weapons have been continuously developed. The atmosphere 
for a comprehensive t st ban emerged only after the end of the Cold War. With the 
end of the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation agreed on a 
substantial reduction of their strategic nuclear weapons, and withdrew respective 
tactical nuclear weapons abroad unilaterally but in parallel. In addition, with the 
end of the Cold War, Russia, France and the U.S. proclaimed a moratorium on 
nuclear testing voluntarily. The U.K., using the U.S. Nevada test site, was obliged 
to follow the de facto moratorium. 
  Substantive negotiations for a CTBT began at the Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva in January 1994. President Bush had not agreed on negotiations on a 
CTBT, arguing that a CTBT was only an ultimate goal. On July 7, 1993, President 
Clinton said; "I have decided to extend the current moratorium on United States 
nuclear testing... And I call on the other nuclear weapon powers to do the same. If 
these nations will join us in observing this moratorium, we will be in the strongest 
possible position to negotiate a comprehensive t st ban." With this statement in the 
background, on January 25, 1994, "the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee 
to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which would contribute ffectively to the 
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process 
of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and 
security". 
  The negotiations of a CTBT were deeply interconnected with the issue of how 
to extend the NPT. The U.S. agreed to begin the negotiations, partly because they 
wanted to get general support for an indefinite extension of the NPT through the 
beginning of negotiations, which meant a fulfillment of the obligation under Article 
VI of the NPT. Non-nuclear-weapon states, in particular non-aligned states, saw 
the fulfillment of Article VI, that is, progress in nuclear disarmament, as a condition 
for its indefinite xtension. They argued for the completion of the negotiations on a
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CTBT before the NPT Review and Extension Conference of Spring 1995. On the 
other hand, the U.K. and France argued that he decision of an indefinite xtension 
of the NPT was a precondition for the completion ofa CTBT. As the negotiations 
on a CTBT were still ongoing when the NPT Conference was held in April and 
May 1995, the decision on the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament provided for the completion of the negotiations ona 
CTBT no later than 1996.2) This set a deadline for the negotiations. In addition, as 
the General Assembly in 1995 asked for the submission ofa draft reaty to the next 
session of the General Assembly, adraft reaty had to be completed by September 
1996. 
  Under these circumstances, states continued the negotiations, discussing many 
issues, including the scope of prohibition, ature of a CTBT organization, content 
of the verification system including on-site inspections, and conditions of its entry 
into force. Although all these issues are worth a thorough examination, this article 
will confine itself to the issue of basic obligations. The purpose of this article is to 
make clear through the examination f the negotiation processes: what activities are 
prohibited; how and why these activities are prohibited; and the meaning of the 
prohibitions themselves. 
  You may assume that he CTBT prohibits any nuclear test in any circumstance 
including underground, because the Treaty is "comprehensive" in comparison with 
the "partial" one in the case of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. However, by 
precisely examining the negotiation processes, you will find the situation is much 
more complex. As the treaty does not define the meaning of "nuclear test", it is 
necessary to make the meaning clear through the examination of treaty-making 
processes.
I. Negotiation Process of Basic Obligations
  The first draft treaty was submitted by Sweden in June 1993, which was revised 
in December 1993.3) After the negotiations tarted, Australia submitted a draft 
treaty in March 1994.4) The form of these draft treaties was based on the Partial 




On this issue, see, Jayantha Dhanapala, "Fulfilling the Promise of the NPT: The CTBT and Beyond," 
Arms Control Today, Vol.26, No.4, May/June 1996, pp.3-6. 
Sweden, Draft Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, CD/1203, 3 June 1993, and CD/1232, 3 
December 1993. 
Australia, Working Paper, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CD/NTB/WP.XX, 30 March 1994.
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However, arguments in the Conference on Disarmament in 1994 were quite various 
and many different opinions were submitted. A rolling text, submitted by a 
chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee at the end of the negotiations in 1994, included 
almost all proposals exhaustively with many brackets as follows:5)
1.
2.
  Many 
above pro 
comprehensive 
nuclear w       weapon 




  During 
the U.S. a        and
Each [State Party,] [of the Parties to this Treaty] undertakes [to prohibit, 
and to prevent, and] not to carry out, [at any place and] [in any 
environment,] any nuclear weapon test [explosion] [which releases 
nuclear energy] [in any form or any type], or any [other] [peaceful] 
nuclear [test] [explosion], [and undertakes to prohibit and prevent any 
such nuclear explosion] at any place [under [or beyond] its jurisdiction 
or control] [,with the exceptions which may be authorized in exceptional 
circumstances] [.] [:] 
[(a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under 
water, including territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) Underground.] 
Each [State Party] [of the Parties to this Treaty] undertakes, 
furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, [assisting,] 
[preparing,] [permitting] or [in any way] participating in, [the carrying 
out anywhere of] any [nuclear [test] [explosion] referred to in paragraph 
I of this Article] [nuclear weapon test [explosion] [as referred to in 
paragraph I of this Article] or any] [other] [peaceful] [nuclear 
explosion] [,which would take place in any of the environments 
described in paragraph I of this Article] .] 
proposals were submitted as to the scope of prohibition, as is shown in the 
visions. In spite of the fact that the mandate is to negotiate a 
   nuclear test ban treaty, the following issues were controversial: Is a
    test or nuclear weapon test explosion prohibited? Is a peaceful 
      permitted or prohibited? Is there an exceptional circumstance 
prohibition does not apply? Does the enumeration of circumstances in
b) mean to permit exceptions? Is preparation for test (explosions) 
the negotiations in 1995, the same controversy continued. However, as 
  Fr ce agreed on a zero yield prohibition, the phrase on exceptional
5) Chairman's Rolling Text of the Treaty, CD/1273/Rev. I , 5 September 1994.
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circumstances was deleted. A rolling text submitted in September 1995, 




Each States Party undertakes [to prohibit, and to prevent, and] not to 
carry out, [at any place and] [in any environment,] any nuclear weapon 
test [explosion] [which releases nuclear energy], [or any other nuclear 
[test] [explosion] ], [or any release of nuclear energy caused by the 
assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical 
explosive of other means,] [and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear 
explosion] [at any place under [or beyond] its jurisdiction or control] [.] 
[:] 
[(a) In the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under 
water, including territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) Underground.] 
Each States Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, 
encouraging, [assisting,] [preparing,] or in any way participating in, the 
carrying out [anywhere] of any nuclear weapon test [explosion] [or any 
other nuclear [test] [explosion]] [or any release] [referred to] [,which 
would take place in any of the environments described] [in paragraph I 
of this Article.]
  Negotiations in 1996 were very intensive, and on May 28, the Chairman 
submitted a draft treaty with no brackets for the first time. 7 Article I on basic 
obligations was stipulated as follows, which has not changed thereafter and was 
later adopted as a treaty provision. The provision is the same as the one included in 
the Model Treaty Text 8) submitted by the Australian delegation in February 1996. 
Consensus was reached after the two-year negotiations.
I
        Article I BASIC OBLIGATIONS 
Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent 




Chairman's Rolling Test of the Treaty, CD/1364, 26 September 1995. 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Australia Model 
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     2. Each States Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing,
        encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any 
        nuclear weapon test explosion or any other explosion. 
  It is clear from this final text that: what is prohibited is not nuclear weapon tests 
but nuclear weapon test explosions; other nuclear explosions, that is, peaceful 
nuclear explosions are prohibited; there is no exception to the prohibition; and, 
preparation for test explosions is not prohibited. I will examine each individual 
issue in the next section looking at which states submitted proposals with what 
intentions, and the final outcome of the negotiations. 
II. Main Issues in the Negotiations 
1. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 
  The most controversial issue during the negotiations regarding the scope of 
prohibition by the Treaty was the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions, although it 
was not supported by many states. The issue was whether a treaty should prohibit 
any nuclear explosions or only nuclear weapon test explosions. Only China argued 
that peaceful nuclear explosions should not be prohibited, because the Treaty 
should not restrict peaceful uses of nuclear energy which was an inalienable right of 
all states. According to China's proposal, a state which wants to conduct peaceful 
nuclear explosions would have to submit an application to an executive council and 
the council would have to approve by a two-third majority. The rolling texts of 
1994 and 1995 included this proposal by China, but they had a footnote as follows: 
"A number of delegations oppose the inclusion in this Treaty of any section on so-
called ` Peaceful Nuclear Explosion"'. 
  China conducted theleast number of nuclear test explosions among the five 
nuclear-weapon states and its technical capability was least developed. China 
conducted nuclear tests constantly while the other four nuclear powers continued a 
moratorium of testing since 1991/2. Although, at the early stage of the 
negotiations, China said that it would stop testing in 1996, later they changed their 
position by saying that China would stop testing when a treaty entered into force. 
Because China's ratification was thought o be indispensable for the treaty to enter 
into force, China's statement meant hat China could test as long as it wished, even 
if a treaty is signed. 
  Under the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
peaceful nuclear explosions are treated the same as nuclear weapon test explosions,
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and both are prohibited. The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear 
Weapon Tests of 1974, which prohibits tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, 
has been complemented by the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for 
Peaceful Purposes of 1976, which sets the same threshold. The U.S. started 
research and development on peaceful nuclear explosions in the 1950s and the 
Soviet Union followed suit later, but both states have abandoned their projects 
because its usefulness was not sufficient and side effects like radioactivity were 
insurmountable. 
  With this background in mind, China's argument for peaceful nuclear 
explosions seemed strange, and many states argued against it. It was doubtful 
whether China really wanted to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions for their 
utility. It was generally assumed that China wanted to develop nuclear weapons 
under the pretext of peaceful nuclear explosions, or that China wanted to delay the 
negotiations because China needed more time to conduct tests before the 
completion of a treaty. In addition, China was thought o be demanding it as a 
bargaining chip in order to get something, and it was feared that China might 
destroy the negotiations.9) In June 1996, China withdrew its proposal. 
2. Tests for Safety and Reliability 
  The U.K. and France demanded the right to conduct nuclear test explosions in 
exceptional circumstances, because, in order to ensure the safety and reliability of 
the existing stockpile, it would be necessary to conduct tests in the future. This 
demand was reflected in the rolling text of 1994, which included a phrase "with the 
exception of any explosions which may be authorized in exceptional 
circumstances". The two states argued for tests for safety and reliability, on the 
basis that the number of their nuclear weapons and nuclear tests were less than 
those of the U.S. and Russia, and it was natural to conduct ests as the possession of 
nuclear weapons was legal. In comparison with the U.K. and France, it was 
argued, the U.S. and Russia had many more nuclear weapons, so that they could 
dismantle unreliable nuclear weapons, and they had enough data because of so 
many tests conducted. 
  These arguments could be convincing in relation to the two superpowers, but 
these were perceived as egoistic by non-nuclear-weapon states. In addition, the
9) Rebecca Johnson, "Endgame Issues in Geneva: Can the CD Deliver the CTBT in 1996?" Arms Control 
   Today, Vol.26, No.3, April 1996, p.3. In addition, China proposed the Articles on no-first use of nuclear 
   weapons, and positive and negative security assurances. Almost all other delegations thought that these 
   issues were outside the mandate, and it was a tactic by China to delay the negotiations.
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arguments were criticized as not fulfilling the standard of "comprehensiveness". 
These tests for safety and reliability could be conducted for developing new nuclear 
weapons. The U.K. and France withdrew their proposal in April 1995. 
  Russia and the U.S. also submitted proposals reflecting their special interests. 
Russia proposed a formula on the environment where testing was prohibited: "(a) In 
the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or under water, including 
territorial waters or high seas; or (b) Underground", in place of "at any place". 
Many states were afraid that this formula seemed to provide a loophole for nuclear 
explosions in an artificial, contained environment, i.e. laboratory. The U.S. 
proposed a provision which would permit easy withdrawal from the Treaty, without 
any particular eason, at a review conference held ten years after its entry into force. 
Many states opposed this proposal because it would weaken the basis of the Treaty, 
and the U.S. withdrew it in January 1995. 
  These proposals were all intended to enable nuclear-weapon states to keep open 
the possibility of conducting nuclear test explosions under the Treaty. However, 
the Treaty finally adopted got rid of all these proposals, and the intention of 
nuclear-weapon states to keep exceptions was destroyed through the negotiations. 
3. Hydronuclear Tests 
  The strongest advocate for permitting hydronuclear tests or experiments under 
the Treaty was the U.S. Hydronuclear tests produce a small nuclear yield and are 
useful for checking computer predictions of the performance of new designs of 
nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. said that the treaty would prohibit any 
explosion without exception, and ` zero yield' hydro-nuclear tests would not be 
considered nuclear explosions per se. In the early stage of the negotiations among 
the five nuclear-weapon states, all were ready to accept he U.S. argument, as well 
as exceptions advocated by other nuclear-weapon states. At the end of 1994, Eric 
Arnett and Annette Schaper said: "Initial signs indicate that the leading figures 
among the non-nuclear weapon states would rather have a comprehensive test ban 
that allows hydronuclear experiments than no ban at all. And that appears to be the 
choice." However, hydronuclear tests are nuclear explosions though their yields 
are very low, and they would be contrary to a comprehensive t st ban. 
  On June 13, 1995, the Government of France announced the resumption of a 
series of nuclear tests from September 1995 to May 1996. International public
10) Eric Arnett and Annette Schaper, "No Hydronuclear Ban," Bulletin 
   No.6, November/December 1994, pp.22-23.
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.50,
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opinion criticized the announcement severely, because China conducted a nuclear 
test just a few days after the NPT Review and Extension Conference which asked 
the nuclear-weapon states to exercise utmost restraint, and then France announced 
the resumption of nuclear tests." It is logical from the viewpoint of France that 
they have to conduct necessary nuclear tests before the treaty is finalized. 
However, from the viewpoint of non-nuclear-weapon states, it represents France's 
nationalism and egoism. Partly in order to get rid of such criticism, on August 10, 
France agreed to a truly comprehensive ban, supporting the ban of low yield 
explosions. 
  President Clinton of the U.S., which was the most active advocate for 
hydronuclear tests, announced its clear commitment to "true zero yield" on August 
11, mainly because of the recommendations by the JASON Committee 12) as well as 
strong international and domestic riticism. In particular, the JASON report seems 
to have influenced decisively the announcement by the President. The Panel, 
consisting of fourteen nuclear and security experts, concludes firstly: "The United 
States can, today, have high confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance 
margins of the nuclear weapons that are designated to remain in the enduring 
stockpile. This confidence is based on understanding ained from 50 years of 
experience and analysis of more than 1000 nuclear tests." It also states: "In the last 
analysis the technical contribution of such a testing program must be weighed 
against its costs and its political impact on the non-proliferation goals of the United 
States." 
  The U.K. agreed with this position on September 14, and Russia tentatively 
supported this formula on October 23, formally accepting a true zero yield at the 
Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security in April 1996. With these 
negotiations, the CTBT was agreed as providing for a truly comprehensive 
prohibition of nuclear explosions. 
4. Preparation for Nuclear Testing 
  The Swedish draft treaty of December 1993 included the prohibition of 
"preparing" as well as causing
, assisting, permitting or participating in the carrying 
out of any nuclear explosion. Many non-nuclear-weapon states, including Sweden, 
Germany, the Netherlands and many non-aligned states, argued that he preparation 
for nuclear testing should be prohibited as a means to strengthen the nuclear non-
11) On nuclear testing by France and China, see, Robert S. Norris, "France and Chinese Nuclear Weapon 
   Testing," Security Dialogue, Vol.27, No.1, March 1996, pp.39-54. 
12) "JASON Nuclear Testing Study," Arms Control Today, Vol.25, No.7, September 1995, pp.34-35.
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proliferation and disarmament function of a CTBT, which would prevent rather 
than monitor violation. According to the opinion of Lars Norberg, Swedish 
Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament: "unless something is done to limit 
or prevent pre-testing activities, a CTBT will have little or no effect on the 
proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities." 13) 
   On the other hand, the U.S., Russia, the U.K., France, and Australia opposed 
including "preparation", because it was difficult to define "preparation" and to 
distinguish it from legal activities, and its verification would be costly and complex. 
Yoshitomo Tanaka, Japan's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, 
explained: "While I understand the importance of problems relating to the 
preparation of nuclear explosion tests, I consider it unrealistic to include provisions 
on it in the treaty text. I foresee considerable difficulties in verifying such a 
prohibition. Because it is also difficult to define clearly what constitute 
preparations for a nuclear explosion, it may not be possible to provide a concrete 
list of activities to be prohibited by a CTBT.... At the same time, I must point out 
that any activities which are clearly preparations for an imminent nuclear test 
should be prohibited through the strict implementation of the basic CTBT 
objectives, even without an explicit provision to prohibit preparation." 14) 
  Some states, including Indonesia, advocated prohibiting activities in 
laboratories, but the Swedish proposal intended to prohibit activities for preparation 
in the field such as digging holes for testing. However, the nuclear-weapon states, 
in particular the U.S., opposed the inclusion of preparation, because they wanted to 
be ready for testing should extraordinary events happen. Australia also opposed the 
inclusion in view of difficulty of verification. As a result, the CTBT does not 
prohibit the preparation of conducting nuclear explosions. 
5. Closure of Test Sites 
  Although the provision for the closure of test sites was not included in the 
rolling texts in 1994 and 1995, some non-aligned states including Iran demanded 
the closure of the existing test sites and the destruction of facilities especially 
designed for nuclear testing. They thought the closure of test sites as a very 
effective measure to ensure a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. The nuclear-
weapon states strongly opposed the proposal of the closure of test sites for the
13) Lars Norberg, "Current Efforts to Negotiate a Nuclear Test-Ban," Disarmament, Vol.XVI, No.3, 1993, 
   p.15. 
14) Yoshitomo Tanaka, "Reviewing the Negotiations - Assessing Prospects for Progress," Disarmament, 
   Vol.XVIII, No.], 1995, p.171.
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reason that test sites are also scientific laboratories and could not be closed. 
However, they in fact wanted to keep test sites open in order to resume testing after 
exercising the right to withdraw from the Treaty, should extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. 
The obligation to close test sites was not agreed, but France closed its only test site 
in Mururoa Atoll, and one of the test sites of the Soviet Union in Semipalatinsk was 
closed because it became the territory of Kazakhstan.
6. Tests without Explosion 
  As is shown in the rolling texts which bracketed ``explosion" regarding 
prohibited activities, the proposal, that any nuclear weapon test should be 
prohibited whether it includes an explosion or not, was submitted by Indonesia. 
Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat, Indonesian Head of the delegation to the Conference 
on Disarmament argued: "The CD should not lose sight of the fact that a CTBT has 
two overriding objectives; to prevent further contamination of the environment 
caused by the conduct of nuclear tests and to halt vertical and horizontal 
proliferation of nuclear weapons as a first step towards completely eliminating 
them from the world's arsenal. With those two objectives in mind, the scope of a 
CTBT should be as comprehensive as possible, closing any possible loophole that 
could be used by a State ambitious to develop or possess nuclear weapons. The 
scope of the treaty must be defined in such a way as to deny a States party the 
opportunity to undertake or carry out `any nuclear weapon test', `in any 
environment'. In that way, the treaty would prevent States parties from conducting 
nuclear weapon tests of any kind using explosive techniques or such non-explosive 
techniques as above-ground experiments, hydrodynamic experiments, inertial 
confinement fusion and computer simulations." 15) 
  This argument was supported by non-aligned states including Egypt and Iran. 
They argued that a CTBT should prohibit any test in connection with nuclear 
weapons, including sub-critical tests or computer simulation. This total prohibition 
with no loophole would clearly show the way to the complete elimination of 
nuclear weapons. India proposed the prohibition of "any release of nuclear energy 
caused by the assembly or compression of fissile or fusion material by chemical 
explosive or other means", in addition to any nuclear weapon explosion and any 
other nuclear test explosion. India argued for the prohibition which might be useful 
for further development and elaboration of nuclear weapons, with no regard
15) Soemadi D.M. Brotodiningrat, "An Indonesian Perspective," Disarmament, VoI.XVII1, No.1, 1995, 
  pp. 114-115.
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whether it had an explosion or not. 
  Opposition to both proposals by the nuclear-weapon-states was extremely 
strong. They argued that such a proposal would hinder peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and require very complex verification measures. As a result, tests without 
explosion are not prohibited under the CTBT. 
III. Significance of the Basic Obligations 
  Under the basic obligation of the CTBT, which was adopted after the 
controversial discussions on the above-mentioned issues, nuclear weapon test 
explosions and other nuclear explosions are prohibited. Explosions are completely 
prohibited, even if their yields are extremely small, and true zero yield is ensured. 
However, tests which are not accompanied explosions are not prohibited, even if 
they relate to nuclear weapons. Neither preparation for testing is prohibited, nor are 
test sites closed. In this section, I will examine the arguments on subcritical 
experiments in the United States, and explore the significance of the basic 
obligations of the CTBT. 
1. Subcritical Experiments 
  On July 2, 1997, the United States conducted the first subcritical experiment, 
named "Rebound" at the Nevada Test Site, which took place in the U1A complex, a 
horizontal tunnel mined about 960 feet beneath the ground surface. J6) The purpose 
of Rebound was said to be to obtain information on the response of plutonium to 
shock wave compression under different high pressure conditions. Three different 
explosive assemblies containing a total of about 75 kilograms of chemical high 
explosive provided three different pressure conditions. This explosive energy was 
directed at about two dozen pieces of plutonium with a total mass of less than 1.5 
kilograms, with the largest being 70 grams. A second experiment named "Holog" 
was conducted at the same place on September 18, 1997. 
  According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), subcritical experiments are 
scientific experiments to obtain technical information in support of DOE's 
responsibility to maintain the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile without nuclear testing. The configuration and quantities of explosives 
and nuclear materials will be such that no nuclear explosion will take place. Thus,
16) The U.S. initially announced the intention to conduct subcritical experiments in June and September 
   1996, but it postponed them because it was during the final and very important stage of the negotiations.
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the experiments are consistent with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 17) 
  The subcritical experiment is a part of the DOE's Science-Based Stockpile 
Stewardship and Management Program, and its origin can be found in the 
President's Address in July 1993, when he suggested the start of CTBT negotia-
tions, saying, "To assure that our nuclear deterrence remains unquestioned under a 
test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, 
the reliability and the performance of our own weapons". Four types of tests that 
have been planned in this program were hydrodynamic tests, high-energy-density 
tests, weapons-effects tests and hydronuclear tests. The stewardship rogram 
includes increased activities in the areas of advanced computation and above-
ground experiments, as well as support for new facilities construction projects.18) 
  Initially, the U.S. argued that hydronuclear tests would not be prohibited under a 
CTBT and planned to continue them under this program after the adoption of the 
Treaty. However, the U.S. changed its interpretation to prohibit hydronuclear 
testing with the submission of the JASON report in August 1995. The JASON 
report emphasized the importance of the stockpile stewardship rogram, and 
concludes: "the U.S. should affirm its readiness to invoke the supreme national 
interest clause should the need arise as a result of unanticipated technical problems 
in the enduring stockpile." 
  Against thisprogram exists strong criticism like: "the program may mean that 
the CTB treaty contains the seeds of its own demise before it is even signed... the 
certification of safety and reliability may be scarcely more than a smokescreen 
behind which the nuclear weapons laboratories are hiding an extensive program to 
build up their capability to design new nuclear warheads." 19) 
2. Significance of the Basic Obligations of the CTBT 
  With those negotiations of the characteristics described above, the CTBT 
prohibits to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear 
explosion as basic obligations. According to the mandate given to the Ad Hoc 
Committee, the treaty would contribute effectively: (i) to the prevention of the
17) U.S. Department of Energy, Fact Sheet, Energy Experiments Comply with Test Ban Treaty, June 2, 
  1997. 
18) Tom Zamora Collina and Ray E. Kidder, "Shopping Spree Softens Test-Ban Sorrows, Bulletin of the 
   Atomic Scientists, Vol.50, No.4, July/August 1994, pp.26-29; U.S. Department of Energy, Officeof 
   Defense Program, The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, May 1995. 
19) Hisham Zeffiffi and Arjun Makhijiani, "The Stewardship Smokescreen," Bulletin of the Atomic 
   Scientists, Vol.52, No.5, September/October 1996, pp.23-24.
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proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects; (ii) to the process of nuclear 
disarmament; and (iii) therefore to the enhancement of international peace and 
security. In other words, three purposes are mentioned here; first, the prevention of 
both horizontal proliferation, which is generally called proliferation, and vertical 
proliferation, which means nuclear development by the nuclear-weapon states; 
second, the contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament; and as a result, the 
enhancement of international peace and security is the third, indirect and general 
purpose. 
  President Clinton, in his address in July 1993, emphasized the non-proliferation 
aspect of a CTBT: "During my campaign for President, I promised a wholehearted 
commitment to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. A test ban can 
strengthen our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear technology in 
weapons.... Additional nuclear tests could help us prepare for a test ban and provide 
for some additional improvements in safety and reliability. However, the price we 
would pay in conducting those tests now by undercutting our own nonproliferation 
goals and ensuring that other nations would resume testing outweighs these 
benefits." As Stephen J. Ledogar, the U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on 
Disarmament, said, "the CTBT must be comprehensive and promote the vital U.S. 
national interest in curbing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the 
same time, the CTBT must not prohibit activities necessary to maintain the safety 
and reliability of its stockpile". 20) The U.S. treated non-proliferation, through a 
CTBT, as its national interest. 
  According to Grigori Berdennikov, Russian Permanent Representative to the 
Conference on Disarmament, "In the opinion of the Russian Federation, the scope 
of the ban should be fully in keeping with the objective of elaborating acomprehen-
sive nuclear test ban treaty, yet must not impair basic scientific research.... The goal 
of a CTBT is to prevent a qualitative improvement of existing arsenals, not to 
eliminate them. Moreover, the scope of a treaty ban should not create insoluble 
problems for verification systems. That applies, above all, to the proposals by 
certain States to include in the scope of the ban the so-called preparations for 
nuclear tests and computer simulations of nuclear explosions. Both, in our view, 
relate to dual-use activities. A treaty banning preparations and computer 
simulations will complicate a verification system and significantly increase its cost. 
Further, it is generally impossible to verify whether simulations are being carried 
out or not."21) Joelle Bourgois, French Permanent Representative tothe Conference
20) Stephen J. Ledogar, "Concluding the Negotiations," Disarmament, Vol.XV111, No.1, 1995, p.149. 
21) Grigori Berdennikov, "A Russian Viewpoint," Disarmament, Vol.XVIII, No.1, 1995, pp.100-101.
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on Disarmament, said, "From the very start of the negotiation, France made clear 
that while accepting that it would have to put a final end to its nuclear testing, it 
was its responsibility, as a nuclear-weapon Power, to ensure the safety and the 
reliability of its weapons. In stressing its responsibility, France repeatedly recalled 
that the future treaty was about he prohibition of testing, not about the prohibition 
of nuclear weapons."22) 
  From these statements by the nuclear-weapon states, it is clear that their main 
purpose of a CTBT is to prevent proliferation, and partly to prevent qualitative 
development of nuclear weapons, but the contribution to nuclear disarmament is not 
mentioned at all. Maurice A. Mallin analyzed: "Broadly defined, there can be three 
objectives for a CTBT: to impede the proliferation of nuclear weapons; to prevent 
the development of new nuclear capabilities; and to facilitate the process of 
disarmament. The United States wholly endorsed the first objective, accepts the 
second, but does not by any means subscribe to the third."23) 
   On the other hand, the opinions of the non-nuclear-weapon states are entirely 
different. The document submitted by the Group 21 of non-aligned states in March 
1994 stated: "The scope of a nuclear test ban should be directed to the prevention of 
both the acquisition of nuclear weapons and of the improvement of existing ones. 
Therefore a CTBT should not be seen merely as a non-proliferation agreement but 
an agreement that can contribute to nuclear disarmament. "24) According to Ajit 
Kumar, Indian Counselor to the Conference on Disarmament, "Since their (five 
nuclear-weapon states) common position is that a CTBT is primarily a non-
proliferation instrument rather than a measure relating to nuclear disarmament 
purpose, they all wanted to find a way of assuring their future weapon design, 
safety, reliability and/or manufacturing capability."2S) Ledwik Dembinski, Polish 
Head of the Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, analyzing nuclear-
weapon states' position regarding their demand of exceptions, stated: "That 
position reflected the view of some nuclear-weapon Powers that CTBT was, above 
all, a non-proliferation measure rather than a nuclear disarmament measure which 
would lead ultimately to the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Their concern
22) Joelle Bourgois, "France's Commitment toa CTBT," Disarmament, Vol.XVIII, No.3, 1995, p.66. 
23) Maurice A. Mallin, "CTBT and NPT: Options for U.S. Policy," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.2, 
   No.2, Winter 1995, p.4. 
24) The Group of 21, Some Key Elements of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, CD/1252, 22 
  March 1994. 
25) Ajit Kumar, "The Still Elusive CTBT," Disarmament, VOLXVIII, No.1, 1995, p.122.
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was to ensure the safety and reliability of their existing weapons."26) Mounir 
Zahran, Ambassador of Egypt to the Conference on Disarmament explained: "The 
treaty should not be seen as a simple international instrument which promotes non-
proliferation, but must be considered as a step leading to the full prohibition and 
elimination of nuclear weapons."27) 
  The opinions on the basic obligations are quite different between the nuclear-
weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states. The nuclear-weapon-states are 
eager to keep the safety and reliability of stockpiles, and to test without explosions 
through means such as subcritical experiments, although nuclear weapon test 
explosions are prohibited. This situation does not completely eliminate the 
possibility of qualitative development of nuclear weapons, though full scale 
development of new nuclear weapons will not be possible. Regarding the condition 
for the treaty to enter into force, Russia, China and the U.K. strongly argued that a 
CTBT was fruitless without participation of India, Pakistan and Israel. Their 
argument means that a CTBT is for non-proliferation. 
  The non-nuclear-weapon states generally emphasized the aspect of the 
promotion of nuclear disarmament through a CTBT. On the other hand, the 
arguments by the nuclear-weapon states lacked this aspect. While the non-nuclear-
weapon states tend to see a CTBT in a wide framework of the whole nuclear 
disarmament process, the nuclear-weapon states have a tendency to treat a CTBT as 
an independent measure.
Conclusion
  First, the fact that the CTBT was adopted and signed by many states is a 
significant progress in nuclear disarmament. A CTBT has been pursued in 
negotiations for the last forty years, and it was generally thought impossible to 
accomplish until a few years ago. The five nuclear-weapon states have signed the 
CTBT, and they are under obligation not to jeopardize the purpose and object of the 
treaty they have signed. Although the treaty will not enter into force for a while, 
the content of the basic obligations has become de facto international norm, the 
deviation from which would be very difficult. The adoption of the treaty should be 
a fulfillment of the obligation under Article VI of the NPT. The treaty will be very 
useful to stop a qualitative nuclear arms race, though it is not complete.
26) Ludwik Dembinski and Henryk Pac, "Legal and Institutional Aspects," Disarmament, Vol.XVIII, No.1, 
   1995, p.89. 
27) Mounir Zahran, "Egypt and the CTBT," Disarmament, Vol.XVIII, No.1, 1995, p.179.
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  Second, the treaty will strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 
nuclear-weapon states have a tendency to stress this aspect. Among the five 
nuclear-weapon states, three continued a moratorium on nuclear testing, France 
stopped testing after a series of tests and China accepted a test ban at the very last 
stage of the negotiations. Thus, these five states hare an interest in not permitting 
India, Pakistan and Israel to test. Israel has already signed the treaty, and Pakistan 
said it would sign if India signs. India is the most noteworthy state, but it would be 
very difficult for India to conduct nuclear tests against he treaty which was adopted 
by overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly, though India has not 
signed it. 
  Third, one aspect of discrimination inherent in the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime is going to be eliminated through this treaty. That is, no state, including 
both nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states, can test any more. The treaty has the 
effect that the military and political usefulness of nuclear weapons will decrease, 
because there will be no significant qualitative nuclear arms race any more. 28) 
  Although the treaty has these three positive aspects, it also contains some 
shortcomings in substantial obligations, in addition to the fact that the treaty will 
not enter into force soon. The promotion of nuclear disarmament aiming at the 
ultimate goal of nuclear elimination is not clear enough in the treaty. The nuclear-
weapon states intend to keep the military effectiveness of their stockpiles through 
subcritical experiments or computer simulations. From now on, best efforts should 
be made to prohibit any test or experiment which may be useful for the qualitative 
development ofnuclear weapons.
28) On the significance of the treaty, see, Jozef Goldblat, "The Thorny Road to a Nuclear Test Ban," 
   Security Dialogue, Vol.26, No.4, December 1995, pp.370-371; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr . and Craig 
   Cerniello, "The CTB Treaty: A Historical Opportunity to Strengthen the Non-Proliferation Regime," 
   Arms Control Today, Vol.26, No.6, August 1996, p.15.
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